Someone asked me about some papers I’m planning to submit for review in the near future. Answering the question is a bit hard to answer in 140 characters and this blog is just taking up space on the internet currently, so I figured I’d describe the projects here in at least a little more detail than I can on Twitter.
1. Rethinking Multi-level Realism: Problems for the Trait-Group Framework of Group Selection
I assume multi-level realism about the levels of selection – the view that natural selection really operates at levels of organization higher than the individual and/or gene – but argue that the trait-group framework offered by Sober and Wilson is not fully adequate as a framework for multi-level realism. The trait-group framework consists of a definition of ‘group’ and a set of definitions for selection at a level. I construct a set of cases that serve to undermine the trait-group framework and suggest a new set of definitions for selection at a level that avoids the problems I raise.
2. Moral Status Enhancement and Non-human Research Subjects.
I explore whether it is possible to enhance the moral status of non-human animals by enhancing their cognitive capacities in the context of research of cognitive enhancement technologies. I explore the various potential bases of the moral status of non-human animals, argue that it is possible to enhance the moral status of research subjects, discuss the ethical issues that arise from this possibility, and develop some research guidelines to avoid ethical infractions in the relevant research contexts.
3. The Extensionist Strategy and The Moral Considerability of Non-individuals
One of the most productive strategies for grounding claims of the direct moral status of individuals has been the extensionist strategy of arguing that there is no morally relevant difference between individuals of kind A and of kind B, that individuals of kind A have direct moral status, and so consistency requires that we extend direct moral status to individuals of kind B. This strategy has been applied with varying degrees of success in attempts to extend moral considerability from humans to sentient non-humans and from sentient beings to non-sentient individuals such as plants. However, many people have objected that the strategy cannot be employed to extend moral considerability to non-sentient non-individuals such as communities or ecosystems. The basis of these objections is that the relevant interests of non-sentient individuals are ultimately grounded their functions which are in turn grounded, at least in part, in selection-etiologies. The objection continues that since selection does not operate at levels higher than the individual, non-individuals cannot have interests in the same way that individuals may. Thus, there is no basis for extension. I argue that these objections are grounded in an implausible view about the levels of selection, develop a version of multi-level selection theory and appeal to a set of empirical results to show that community-selection is possible. This shows that current objections to the use of the extensionist strategy in the case of non-sentient non-individuals fail.
Some Papers I’m Sending Off Soon
Someone asked me about some papers I’m planning to submit for review in the near future. Answering the question is a bit hard to answer in 140 characters and this blog is just taking up space on the internet currently, so I figured I’d describe the projects here in at least a little more detail than I can on Twitter.
1. Rethinking Multi-level Realism: Problems for the Trait-Group Framework of Group Selection
I assume multi-level realism about the levels of selection – the view that natural selection really operates at levels of organization higher than the individual and/or gene – but argue that the trait-group framework offered by Sober and Wilson is not fully adequate as a framework for multi-level realism. The trait-group framework consists of a definition of ‘group’ and a set of definitions for selection at a level. I construct a set of cases that serve to undermine the trait-group framework and suggest a new set of definitions for selection at a level that avoids the problems I raise.
2. Moral Status Enhancement and Non-human Research Subjects.
I explore whether it is possible to enhance the moral status of non-human animals by enhancing their cognitive capacities in the context of research of cognitive enhancement technologies. I explore the various potential bases of the moral status of non-human animals, argue that it is possible to enhance the moral status of research subjects, discuss the ethical issues that arise from this possibility, and develop some research guidelines to avoid ethical infractions in the relevant research contexts.
3. The Extensionist Strategy and The Moral Considerability of Non-individuals
One of the most productive strategies for grounding claims of the direct moral status of individuals has been the extensionist strategy of arguing that there is no morally relevant difference between individuals of kind A and of kind B, that individuals of kind A have direct moral status, and so consistency requires that we extend direct moral status to individuals of kind B. This strategy has been applied with varying degrees of success in attempts to extend moral considerability from humans to sentient non-humans and from sentient beings to non-sentient individuals such as plants. However, many people have objected that the strategy cannot be employed to extend moral considerability to non-sentient non-individuals such as communities or ecosystems. The basis of these objections is that the relevant interests of non-sentient individuals are ultimately grounded their functions which are in turn grounded, at least in part, in selection-etiologies. The objection continues that since selection does not operate at levels higher than the individual, non-individuals cannot have interests in the same way that individuals may. Thus, there is no basis for extension. I argue that these objections are grounded in an implausible view about the levels of selection, develop a version of multi-level selection theory and appeal to a set of empirical results to show that community-selection is possible. This shows that current objections to the use of the extensionist strategy in the case of non-sentient non-individuals fail.